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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 04-4184
                    
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL SHAWN WOODS,
                                      Appellant
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
D.C. Crim. No. 03-cr-00039E
District Judge:  The Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 13, 2005
                    
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
                    
(Opinion Filed September 20, 2005)
                    
OPINION
                    
BARRY, Circuit Judge
A six count indictment charged Michael Woods with, among other things,
manufacturing methamphetamine. Woods filed a motion to suppress, which the District
2Court denied.  Woods then pled guilty, conditioned on his right to appeal the following
issue: “Suppression of evidence located in his barn due to an alleged unlawful search of
that barn.” Supp. App.19.  The District Court sentenced Woods to 108 months in prison
to be followed by three years of supervised release.  Woods timely appealed.  We will
affirm the conviction and remand for resentencing. 
This appeal centers on whether the District Court erred in concluding that the
officers had probable cause to search Woods’ barn -- or to be precise, a room in Woods’
barn -- without a warrant.  We review the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as
to the underlying factual determinations, and exercise plenary review over the application
of the law to those facts.  See United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2005). 
In March 2003, Melanie Hansen, a probation officer charged with supervising one
Dale Spangler, received a phone call from Spangler’s girlfriend, Terry Hart, who
informed Hansen that she had kicked Spangler out of her house.  Spangler had not told
Hansen of his new address and did not show up for a scheduled appointment with her. 
On the day of the missed appointment, Hart called to tell Hansen that Spangler was using
drugs and was now living with Woods.  Several days later, Hart again called, this time to
tell her that Spangler was then at Woods’ residence. 
Armed with this knowledge of Spangler’s whereabouts, and because Spangler had
      The officers had probable cause to believe that Spangler had violated the terms of his1
probation.  This is not in dispute.  Among other violations, Spangler missed a scheduled
meeting with his probation officer, and, under Pennsylvania law, this entitled his
probation officer to immediately arrest him without a warrant. 61 P.S. § 309.1.   
3
violated probation,  the decision was made to arrest him.  Hansen, her supervisor, another1
probation officer, and a Pennsylvania State Trooper went to Hart’s house.  Hart told them
that she had just spoken to Spangler and that he was at Woods’ house, probably in the
barn.  She stated that there were approximately eight adults and some juveniles at the
house, a lot of traffic, and “a possible meth lab.” A49.   The local constable arrived and
informed the officers that he, too, was aware of a lot of traffic and drug action going on at
the house. 
Hart led the officers by car to Woods’ property.  Spangler’s truck was in the
driveway.  The officers called for back-up, and once it arrived, broke into two groups. 
One group surrounded the house, while the other group approached the barn, because, as
Hansen explained, this was where she had been told that Spangler was probably staying.   
The team that approached the barn identified themselves, and ordered Spangler to
come out.  They did not hear a response, and entered the barn.  Once inside, Woods came
out of a room on the upper level and asked the officers what was going on.  The officers
ordered Woods onto the ground, handcuffed him, and asked him where they could find
Spangler. Woods said that Spangler was in the house.  The State Trooper went into the
room that Woods had just exited to see if anyone else was there.  When the Trooper
4emerged, he said “I smell meth in here; he’s cooking meth.  I see methamphetamine.” 
A87.  Shortly thereafter, Spangler was found in the house and placed under arrest. 
Spangler told the officers that he had been staying at Woods’ house, and that Woods had
“turned me onto lines of meth a few times downstairs in the barn,” but that he was not
allowed upstairs.  A90.  Armed with this information, and the Trooper’s observations of
the meth lab in the upstairs room, a search warrant was obtained and the evidence which
led to Woods’ arrest and indictment seized.
 On appeal, Woods argues that the District Court erred in finding that the
warrantless search of the barn was a lawful protective sweep.  We note that the only
warrantless search was that of the room in the barn from which Woods emerged.  We
note, as well, that it appears that all or virtually all of the evidence against Woods came
from that room and not elsewhere in the barn. 
The Supreme Court has held that the police cannot enter the residence of a third
party to search for an individual subject to arrest, unless they have a separate search
warrant to do so.  Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1981).  The Court,
however, noted that there are some exceptions to this rule, such as when the third
person’s home is, in fact, the residence of the person that the police seek to arrest.  See id.
at 221; see also Shea v. Smith, 966 F.2d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 1992) (police armed with
probable cause can enter a third party’s home without a search warrant if they believe the
suspect resides there).    
5Here, the officers had a reasonable belief that Spangler was residing with Woods
because his girlfriend told them so, and had told them that he was probably staying in the
barn.  Additionally, when the officers arrived at the Woods’ property, Spangler’s vehicle
was in the driveway.  No search warrant was necessary before they could enter Woods’
barn to look for and arrest Spangler and, the government’s suggestion to the contrary, we
do not understand Woods to be seriously challenging the entry itself.  
But, says Woods, even if the officers could have entered the barn to arrest
Spangler, they did not have the right to search the barn under the pretext of a protective
sweep.   We need not decide whether there was a “protective sweep” here, and if so,
whether it was lawful.  We need only find that, it being undisputed that, under
Pennsylvania law, the officers had the authority to arrest Spangler, until the point of his
arrest they had the right to search anywhere in the barn that he might been found.  See
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).   Because, therefore, the Trooper’s entry
into the room in which the meth lab was found was lawful, the District Court did not err
in denying the motion to suppress the evidence emanating therefrom.  
We will affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing
under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).   
